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Abstract
We model competing ecolabels sponsored by an industry trade association and an
environmental group. For either sponsor in autarky, multi-tier labels are more attrac-
tive when there are many producers with high cost of quality, and the cost gap between
low-cost and high-cost firms is large. When the two sponsors compete using binary
ecolabels, multiple equilibria exist, and either sponsor may offer the more ambitious la-
bel; competition may increase environmental protection. When sponsors compete using
multi-tier labels, however, there exists a unique equilibrium and competition produces
less environmental protection than would the NGO in autarky.
2
1 Introduction
Global environmental issues such as biodiversity and climate change are increasingly important
to citizens around the world, but are extremely difficult for governments to address with stan-
dard policy tools. The globalization of trade and the need for international coordination on global
issues make harmonized world standards for environmental problems unlikely in the foreseeable
future. Global trade law also makes it difficult for governments to attempt to regulate attributes
of production processes beyond their borders. In response, many groups (both industry trade asso-
ciations and environmental advocacy groups) have put increasing effort into international market
mechanisms involving ecolabeling (Steering Committee, 2012).
Ecolabels can be of two types: binary or multi-tiered. Binary labels establish a threshold of
performance and award a label to any product that meets or exceeds it. Binary labels include Forest
Stewardship Certification (FSC) for forest products and Rainforest Alliance certification for coffee.
Multi-tier labels establish a “ladder” of graduated performance levels, and award different labels
depending on a product’s performance. Perhaps the best-known multi-tier label is Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification for buildings, which offers Certified, Silver,
Gold, and Platinum levels.
Ecolabels also differ according to the sponsor of the label, with some offered by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) with a mission of environmental advocacy, and others offered by industry
trade associations. NGO labels include FSC and Rainforest Alliance, while industry labels include
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) certification for forest products and Green Globes for buildings.
Although there is a substantial theoretical literature on ecolabels, it has largely ignored the
possibility of multi-tiered labels, the possibility of strategic competition between labels, and the
different objectives of NGO and industry sponsors. Fischer and Lyon (2014) was the first paper to
study strategic competition between labels, and to allow different objectives for NGO and industry
sponsors. The present paper examines when each of these types of sponsors prefers to offer a binary
label as opposed to a multi-tier label, and goes on to explore the nature of equilibrium when labels
from both types of sponsors compete. We seek to characterize the nature of the ecolabels that are
offered by each type of sponsor in equilibrium, and to assess the impact of multi-tiered labels and
of label competition on overall environmental protection.1
We study credence goods, for which consumers cannot discern product quality on their own,
even after consumption, and hence rely on labels to provide information about quality. We build
on the standard duopolistic model of vertical product differentiation, in which all consumers prefer
1Li and van’t Veld (2015) explore similar issues under a quite different set of assumptions, as we explain in more
detail below.
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higher-quality products, but differ in their willingness to pay for quality. However, because markets
in which ecolabeling is common typically have many small producers rather than a duopoly, we
allow for two classes of price-taking firms, some with low costs of improving quality and some
with high costs of doing so. A multi-tier label creates incentive compatibility constraints that
require label sponsors to distort environmental standards if they wish to induce low-cost firms to
choose higher levels of performance. Consequently, from the perspective of either industry profits
or environmental performance, binary labels may be preferred to multi-tier labels.
Two different types of organization may sponsor labels: an NGO seeks to maximize environ-
mental benefits, while an industry trade association seeks to maximize the aggregate profits of
the industry. For either type of sponsor, labels can take one of three basic forms. First, a single
stringent standard can be set that can only be achieved by low-cost firms. Second, a single weak
standard can be set that can be met by all firms. Third, two separate standards can be set, with
the standard for low-cost firms distorted by the need to ensure that they do not pool with the
high-cost firms.
For either sponsor in autarky, the optimal label format depends upon the mix of high-cost
and low-cost firms, and the magnitude of the cost gap between them. When NGO and industry
labels compete using binary labels, multiple equilibria exist, and environmental protection may
be enhanced by competition. When the labels compete using multi-tier labels, however, there
exists a unique equilibrium pair of standards, and competition always provides less environmental
protection than would the NGO in autarky.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, its
context within the literature, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of binary
and multitiered labels. Section 3 characterizes binary ecolabels, considering first the binary label
for the NGO in autarky, then the industry’s optimal binary label, and finally the equilibrium when
they compete. Section 4 characterizes multi-tier ecolabels, again considering first the optimal label
for each entity in autarky, and then the equilibrium under competition. Section 5 discusses our
results in the context of the stylized facts about ecolabel proliferation, and section 6 concludes.
2 Model Specifications and Context
We formulate a model with heterogeneous consumer preferences for ecolabel characteristics and
heterogeneous costs for meeting ecolabel standards, depending on a firm’s type. The demand side
of our model uses the standard vertical product differentiation framework, in which all consumers
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prefer greener products, but differ in their willingness to pay for environmental quality.2 The supply
side of our model, however, makes some novel assumptions that depart from the standard vertical
differentiation model. In the canonical model, there are two firms with different costs of increasing
product quality; the firms differentiate, with the high-cost firm offering a low-quality product and
the low-cost firm offering a high-quality product and earning higher profits (e.g., Lehmann-Grube
1997). However, the actual markets in which ecolabeling is common–such as agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries–typically have many small producers rather than a duopoly. Thus, in our model
we allow for two classes of firms, some with low costs of improving environmental performance
(“quality”) and some with high costs of quality, but with many small price-taking firms in each
class. The number of firms within each class is exogenously given, and we study the implications
of varying the mix of these two classes of firms. The fixed industry size can reflect a short-run
timeframe or be motivated by an (unmodeled) fixed cost of entry for each type.
Like many other papers, we treat environmental quality as a credence good, so consumers are
unable to discern the environmental attributes of a product on their own, even after consumption.
Hence they rely on ecolabels to provide information about these attributes. Two different types
of organization may offer ecolabels: an NGO seeks to maximize environmental benefits, while an
industry trade association seeks to maximize the aggregate profits of the industry.
Our focus on strategic ecolabel competition motivates some assumptions regarding the certifi-
cation industry that depart from some related strands of the literature. One strand of the literature
follows Lizzeri (1999), who assumes certification bodies seek to maximize their own profits, which
leads them to set low standards and extract all industry rents through high certification fees. In
the case of ecolabels, however, this seems to be sharply at odds with reality, where certification
bodies are often non-profit organizations and chronically close to bankruptcy. Instead of assum-
ing certification bodies maximize profits, we assume they costlessly set standards that serve the
objectives of either NGOs or industry members. Another strand of the literature focuses on the
imperfect nature of certification, allowing for Type I errors (incorrect rejection of a product that is
truly green) and/or Type II errors (failure to reject a product that is not truly green). Hamilton
and Zilberman (2006) pursue this approach in a setting with a monopolistic certification body and
two quality options (green and brown) where sellers may engage in fraud, i.e. they allow for Type
II errors. Mason (2011) pursues the noisy certification approach in a setting with a monopolistic
certification body and two quality options (green and brown), and allows for both Type I and Type
II errors. Harbaugh et al. (2012) study competition between exogenously set standards enforced
2Mussa and Rosen (1978) originated this modeling framework. Unlike a representative consumer model (Fischer
and Lyon 2014), this structure implies that the demand for higher-quality products depends on both their own price
and the price of lower-quality substitutes.
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by error-prone auditors. While we believe it would be of interest to model the certification industry
in more detail, including the possiblity of certification errors and the agency relationship between
certification bodies and auditors (as in Lerner and Tirole 2006), we leave this task for future work,
opting instead to focus on the implications of strategic competition between standard-setting bodies
that have differing objectives in a setting where there is a continuum of possible quality options.
This paper builds on our own previous work (Fischer and Lyon 2014), which was the first paper
to study strategic competition between two certification bodies with differing objectives. That
paper, however, allowed each certification body to set only binary standards, so it assumed away
the issue that takes center stage here, namely the incentives of certification bodies to choose between
binary and multi-tiered standards. It also employed rather different models of demand and supply,
using a simple representative consumer model based on that in Heyes and Maxwell (2004) and a
continuum of firms with differing costs of quality. We believe the modeling choices we make in the
present paper provide a better setting for exploring multi-tiered labels. The simpler treatment of
the supply side of the model (two types instead of a continuum) allows us to obtain explicit results
for strategic multi-tier competition in a more nuanced model of demand. At the same time, we
maintain our focus on the competition between NGO-led and industry-led ecolabels.
The only other paper that examines similar issues is Li and van’t Veld (2015), who also study
strategic competition between NGO and industry ecolabels in a context with heterogeneous con-
sumer preferences. However, they make some very different assumptions that lead to very different
results. Most importantly, they assume all firms have the same marginal production cost of pro-
ducing an environmentally-friendly product. As a result, all firms are indifferent between labels of
varying stringency, and the industry association has no preferences regarding competition or the
number of tiers offered by labeling schemes as long as at least one standard is set at the level that
maximizes the green market’s size. In addition, when they study competition between labels, they
limit themselves to binary labels, as in Fischer and Lyon (2014). Thus, our paper is the first to
obtain results on competition between certifiers setting multi-tiered labels.
2.1 Consumers
We consider two quality levels for the ecolabel standards: a basic level,  and a more ambitious
level    To represent the demand for ecolabel stringency, let consumers have utility  = −
with  ∈ [0 1] distributed according to density function () Then we can find the consumer at
 who is indifferent between buying the product with the basic ecolabel and not buying at all:
 −  = 0
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Next we identify the consumer at  who is indifferent between the two qualities:
 −  =  − 
Solving for these preference levels we have
 = 


and
 = 
 − 
 −  
Assuming () is uniform on [0 1], then () = 1 and as shown in Figure 1 there are three groups
of consumers. Consumers with the lowest taste for quality do not buy an ecolabeled product, and
their aggregate demand is
0 = 

 
Consumers with the highest taste for quality purchase the high-quality product, and their aggregate
demand is
 = 1− 
 − 
 −  
Finally, consumers with moderate taste for quality purchase the low-quality product, and their
aggregate demand is
 = 
 − 
 −  −

 =
 − 
( − ) 
Note that in the case of a single, binary label with standard  and price  , consumer demand
is
 = 1− 

 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
2.2 Firms
On the supplier side of the market, there are  price-taking firms, each producing one unit of the
product with environmental damage . Firms can take measures to reduce their environmental
damages, with damages falling to  −  if the firm undertakes measures of stringency  We will
limit our analysis to cases where  ≥ 0 The firms can be divided into two types, based on their costs
of meeting the label requirements. For a firm of type , the cost of adopting a label of stringency
 is  ¡¢2. Thus, costs are quadratic in label stringency and the marginal cost of quality is 2.
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Profits for firm  pursuing label  are the revenues  minus these costs:
 =  −  ¡¢2 
There are  firms with low cost parameter  that are better suited to pursue the ambitious
standard and  firms (having higher costs   ) that are better suited for the basic label.
(We make the matching between firms and standards precise below.) Let  =  +  Our
market scale is such that   1, since the distribution of consumers sums to 1.
2.3 Price Determination
If standards are set in such a way that the two types of firms prefer different labels, then in
equilibrium supply equals demand, so that  =  and  = We can then work backwards
to solve for prices as a function of the standards. First, we obtain the price for the basic standard.
From  =  + = 1− , we obtain
 = (1−)
Note that this price is a function of the basic standard alone and does not depend on the ambitious
standard.
Next, we solve for the price of the ambitious standard. Setting  =  and substituting in
for  we obtain
 = (1−)− 
Now we can compute profits. The profit of a low-quality firm meeting standard  is
() =  −  ¡¢2 = (1−)−  ¡¢2
and the profit of a high-quality firm meeting standard  is
() =  −  ¡¢2 = (1−)−  −  ¡¢2 
Environmental gains from the industry’s choices are
 =  + 
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2.4 Conditions for a Multi-Tier Equilibrium
The foregoing discussion assumes that the standards are such that a separating equilibrium exists
in which the two types of firms prefer different labels. To characterize when this occurs, let us define
the maximum single standard (i.e., when the other standard is absent; subscript “E” indicates this
is the most environmentally friendly standard possible) that generates non-negative profits for each
firm type:
 ≡ (1−);
 ≡ (1−)   
Other useful points of reference are the single standards that maximize profits for each individual
type (subscript “” indicates profit maximization):
 ≡ 2;
 ≡ 2   
For each firm type we have two constraints: 1) Individual Rationality (IR), which requires that
profits be non-negative, and 2) Incentive Compatibility (IC), which requires that profits be higher
with the firm’s own standard than with the other type’s standard, given the prevailing prices.
In a multi-tier equilibrium, for low-cost firms to prefer the ambitious standard, the IR constraint
requires () ≥ 0 or  ≤  and the IC constraint for an individual type-A firm (“ICA
constraint”) requires () ≥ () =  − ()2, which reduces to
 ≤ ICA() ≡  − 
implying a one-to-one tradeoff as  is increased.
In a similar fashion, in order for high-cost firms to prefer the basic standard, the IR constraint
requires () ≥ 0, or  ≤   and the IC constraint for an individual type-B firm (“ICB
constraint”) requires () ≥  −  ¡¢2, which reduces to
 ≥ ICB() ≡ (1−) − 
Note that as long as the ambitious standard is above the profit-maximizing standard for the
high-cost firms (which we will see can be safely assumed), the incentive-compatible basic standard
that would generate the same profits as deviating to  will not be higher than that type’s profit-
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maximizing standard (ICB ≤  ).
We also define an exclusionary standard  () that is just high enough to exclude a high-cost
firm from opting for the ambitious standard, given :
 ≥  () ≡ (1−) − 
Our basic notation is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows profits for each firm type as a function
of . Profits for Type B firms following the basic standard do not depend on the ambitious standard.
Profits for the ambitious firms, however, do depend on the level of the basic standard, and in Figure
2 we illustrate type-A profits only for the case where  = 0. In addition, we graph the profits
of an individual type-B firm should it deviate to  which also depend on the level of the basic
standard to which the other high-cost firms are adhering, and we again illustrate the case of  = 0
In the case shown, an ambitious standard set at  would fail to exclude a high-cost firm, since
   (0) Put differently, the standard  would entice a high-cost firm to adopt it if no basic
standard were available, because  = 0  ICB( ) If, however, the cost difference between the
firm types were larger, we could have  (0)   , in which case the high-cost firm types would be
excluded from the ambitious standard.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Note that if the high-cost firms have non-negative profits with the basic standard, then a
fortiori the low-cost firms would have positive profits with that standard (()  () ≥ 0);
thus if the incentive compatibility constraint is met for the low-cost firms, then their individual
rationality constraint is automatically satisfied, that is, () ≥ ()  () ≥ 0. Thus, in
an equilibrium with two standards, four constraints must be met:
1. 0 ≤  ≤ 
2.  ≤ 
3.  ≥ ICB()
4.  ≤ ICA()
Together, these imply that  satisfies
max{ICB 0} ≤  ≤ min{   − ICA}
3 Autarky Policies
We begin our analysis by characterizing the preferred labeling standards when each certifying body
can set them on their own, without threat of competition. First, we consider the selection of binary
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labels, as has been assumed in most of the prior literature on ecolabeling. Then we analyze behavior
when a single labeling body has the option to set two tiers of standards.
3.1 Binary Labels
3.1.1 NGO
The NGO objective is to maximize total environmental gains:
 =  +
These gains are strictly increasing in each standard, so if the NGO can set only one standard,
in autarky it chooses between , the ambitious standard to which only the low-cost firms would
adhere, and  , the single basic standard to which both types would adhere. It is straightforward
to establish the conditions under which the ambitious option is preferred, namely
  Θ ≡ 
(1−)
(1−)  (1)
Proposition 1 In autarky with binary labels, the NGO chooses a single ambitious standard of 
when   Θ , and chooses a single basic standard of  otherwise.
Proof. The NGO simply chooses between  and  based on which offers more environmental
protection, that is, on whether     Some algebraic manipulation shows that this can be
reduced to the condition   Θ 
Figure 3 illustrates the NGO’s choice of binary standard, based on the relative costs and market
share of the low-cost types. The shaded areas indicate where the ambitious standard is preferred,
and they depend on  . Together, the overlapping shaded areas reveal that the preference for an
ambitious standard is more likely (i) the greater is the cost advantage of the low-cost firms over
the high-cost firms, (ii) the greater is the number of low-cost firms relative to the the total number
of firms, and (iii) the larger is the share of the certified market overall.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
3.1.2 Industry
We assume the objective of the industry trade association in setting its standards is to maximize
the total profits of all firms:
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Π = ((1−)−  −  ¡¢2) +((1−)−  ¡¢2)
When it is limited to binary labels, the industry must choose between an ambitious standard
and a basic standard. Let Π be the basic standard that maximizes joint profits with both types
participating. These joint profits are
Π = 
³
(1−)−  ¡¢2´ 
where  ≡ ( +) Taking the first-order condition, we solve for Π:
Π = (1−)
2  (2)
Note that since  ∈ ( ), it is necessarily the case that Π ∈ (   ). In other words, if the
industry chooses a basic standard, it is higher than the profit-maximizing standard for the high-cost
firms and lower than the profit-maximizing standard for the low-cost firms. In addition, if Π is
chosen, it must be that Π   , since if Π ≥  , then by definition the high-cost firms have no
profits while the low-cost firms have lower profits than they would with  , and hence Π cannnot
be optimal.
Alternatively, the industry can choose an ambitious standard that cannot be met by the type
B firms and maximizes the profits of the low-cost firms,
Π = ((1−)−  ¡¢2)
For a high-cost firm to be unwilling to participate in the ambitious standard, it must be that
−  ¡¢2  0. If this condition holds for  (and the associated  =  (1−) that would
obtain if no B’s participated), then if the industry opts for the ambitious standard it will simply
choose  . On the other hand, if  (1 − ) − 
¡ ¢2  0, then the industry must raise the
the ambitious standard above  if it wants to exclude participation by high-cost firms. In the
absence of a basic standard, the ambitious standard that just leaves the profit of a high-cost firm
at zero (given that  = 0) is
 (0) = (1−
)
 
We further note that  (0) = (1−)  (1−) =   The difference exists because  is
the standard at which high-cost firms earn zero profits if all of them certify to the standard, whereas
 () is the standard at which a single high-cost firm earns zero profits if it is the only one to certify
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to the ambitious firms’ standard. It is easy to see that  (0)   if (1−)  (1−)2
or   12
We can now establish the conditions under which  is preferred to the basic label, which some
algebra reveals to be

  Θ

 ≡ 
(1−)2
( +)(()2 + (1−)2)− 2()2  (3)
Similarly, we solve for the conditions under which  (0) is preferred to Π:

  Θ
 ≡ 12 +
p(2− −) −q()2 (1−)2
2(1−)
If  (0) is chosen, the relative costs must lie in a window between 12 and Θ  Θ 
since a larger cost difference is required for the even more ambitious label to be preferred to the
joint-profit-maximizing basic label.3 We summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In autarky with binary labels, industry chooses between max[   (0)] and Π
based on which offers greater industry profits. It chooses a single ambitious standard of  if
  Θ and   12; it chooses  (0) if 12    Θ ; and it chooses a
single basic standard of Π otherwise.
Thus, much like the NGO, the industry chooses the ambitious label if the low-cost firms have
a substantial cost advantage relative to the cost of the average firm. However, its response to the
presence of a large number of firms is quite different. Intuitively, since total revenues are quadratic
in the number of firms certifying, if  is large (i.e.,   05) then it can be worthwhile to restrict
the number of firms in the certified market by setting the ambitious standard and driving up the
certified price.
Figure 4 illustrates the industry’s choice of binary standard when  = 12. The shaded areas
indicate where the single ambitious standard is preferred. The darker area reveals that when Type
A costs are more than half those of Type B, the ICB constraint binds at  , and the industry must
raise the standard to  . As a result, the tradeoff between binary standards is not monotonic
in  . This is because as the low-cost market share increases, the cost of the exclusionary
ambitious standard becomes higher, while Π approaches  , and their prices converge as well.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
3Note that Θ  12 for small enough values of  in which case  (0) is not profit-maximizing.
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The following proposition compares the industry and NGO binary standards in autarky.
Proposition 3 In autarky with binary labels, the industry’s binary standard may be higher than
the NGO’s binary standard but always offers less environmental protection.
Proof. The industry chooses between max[   ] and Π and the NGO chooses between  and
 We showed above that Π   and Π   , so whenever the industry chooses the basic label
it is less stringent than the NGO’s. For the ambitious label, any viable standard that will attract
participation, including max[   ] can be no stricter than the NGO’s ambitious standard  Yet,
a range of parameters exists under which the industry chooses    or chooses    when
the NGO would choose  over , preferring greater participation. However, by definition, since
the NGO maximizes environmental protection, any other choice of binary standard offers less.
Figure 5 overlays the binary standard choices for the industry and NGO when  = 12. Here
we clearly see the regions where (i) both types would prefer a basic or ambitious standard, in which
case the NGO always has a more stringent one; (ii) the NGO pursues an ambitious standard while
the industry sets a basic one; and (iii) the industry sets an ambitious standard while the NGO
chooses a basic one.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
3.2 Multi-Tier Labels
We turn now to characterizing multi-tier labels. We show that, for both the NGO and the industry,
a multi-tiered label is not always preferred to a single label. Furthermore, the nature of the
circumstances under which a multi-tiered or binary label is preferred differs greatly across the label
sponsors.
3.2.1 NGO Standards
First, consider the NGO incentives for a multi-tier standard in the absence of competition from the
industry standard-setting organization. To maximize environmental gains, , the NGO wants to set
both standards as high as possible, subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints (that  ≤  and  ≤ ICA =  − ). Thus, there are three options for the pair
{ }:4
4Note that the NGO would be happy to have the high-cost firm want to adopt the more ambitious standard, so the
ICB constraint is not a concern. Note also that the gains are linear in abatement and recall that ICA = −1,
so there can be no interior solution with 0     and  = ICA .
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1. { 0}, a single ambitious standard that can only be met by low-cost firms;
2. { −   }, a multi-tier standard; or
3. {  } a single basic standard in which both types participate.
Intuitively, the first strategy occurs when the NGO does not wish to dilute the ambitious
standard (which is necessary to meet the ICA constraint) by offering a lower-tiered standard.
The second, multi-tier strategy requires market conditions that support a differentiated standard
(namely, a large enough cost differential). The third strategy of a single basic standard occurs
when the multi-tier standard is not supported and the NGO prefers this binary standard over the
ambitious one.
Formally, from the NGO’s perspective, the multi-tier standard dominates the single ambitious
standard when ( − ) +   , or simply when   2. Thus, when the
low-cost firms have more than half of the labelled market share, the NGO does not wish to water
down the ambitious standard to accomodate a positive basic standard.
The multi-tier standard dominates the single basic one when ( − ) +   , or
 −    . Note that this is equivalent to    . This means that the cost gap between the
two types of firms is sufficiently large, i.e.
   →   Θ ≡ (1−)2(1−) (4)
In this case, with the basic standard at  , the NGO can always find a higher standard that the
low-cost firms will accept.5
The single ambitious standard dominates the single basic one when    , or when
  Θ , as in the previous section. Thus when the low-cost firms have more than half
of the certified market, and the cost gap is large enough, the single ambitious standard dominates
both the multi-tier and the single basic standard. Note that Θ  12 when   12,
and    was the condition for the basic standard to dominate the multitiered one, so   
is a necessary condition to warrant a single basic standard.6
5Note that when   12 the right-hand side of this condition is greater than unity for small values of 
which means that the multi-tier standard is preferred to the single basic standard regardless of the cost gap when
the number of low-cost firms is small enough.
6Note that Θ is concave in  is equal to unity at  =  and  = 1 −  and is strictly greater
than unity for  between 1 −  and  . Thus, if   1 −  i.e., if   12 then   Θ for all  1− (Since  ≤  there are two cases to consider. If   1− i.e., if   12 then the right-hand
side rises monotonically in  reaching a maximum of unity when  =  On the other hand, if   1− i.e.,
if   12 then as  increases from zero, the right-hand side rises monotonically from zero to unity at  = 1−
and remains greater than unity for all  ∈ (1 − ) In this case,   (1 − )((1 − )) for all
  1−)
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Market Shares NN  12 NN  12
Relative Costs Θ 

Θ 

 Θ 

 Θ
s   ICA 
s 0   
Table 1: Characterization of the NGO Label in Autarky
The possible equilibria are summarized in Table 1 and illustrated graphically in Figures 6a
and 6b, which show how the set of equilibria changes as  increases. In particular, we illustrate
separately the cases with three equilibria (we show the example of  = 12 but the figure is
qualitatively similar for   23) and with two equilibria (when  ≥ 23). The reason for the de-
pendence on  is that the boundary conditions on  determining when a single basic standard
is preferred to the alternatives change with  , as discussed above. In general, the equilibria can
be characterized as follows, although the details depend upon  . When there are more low-cost
firms than high-cost firms, and costs are sufficiently different, the NGO sets a single ambitious
standard targeted at the efficient firms. When the high-cost firms are more numerous, and costs
are sufficiently different, the NGO offers a multi-tier label in which the basic standard is at its
maximum level and the ambitious standard is distorted downwards to accomodate the low-cost
firms’ IC condition. However, if the cost gap between the two types of firms is small, given the
market shares, the NGO offers a single basic label that all firms can meet, and that pushes the
high-cost firms up against their IR constraint. The NGO label for the case where  = 12 is
illustrated below.
[Insert Figure 6a about here]
As mentioned above, if overall industry size is large enough, the NGO’s strategy changes dis-
tinctly. We characterize this change in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 For  ≥ 23 it is never optimal for the NGO to set the single basic standard.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As the number of firms in the certification market grows, the value to the NGO of setting the
single basic standard diminishes until at  ≥ 23 it is dominated by one of the two other options.
This case is illustrated in Figure 6b below.
[Figure 6b about here]
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Thus, when  ≥ 23 the NGO chooses between ( 0) and ( −   ). The multi-tier
standard dominates the single ambitious standard when   2.7
We summarize the foregoing analysis in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 When multitier labels are possible, the NGO’s optimal standard in autarky is as
follows. If   23 and   12 then the optimal standard is ( 0) if   Θ
and (  ) if   Θ . If   23 and   12, then the optimal standard is
( −   ) if   Θ and (  ) if   Θ If   23 then the optimal
standard is ( 0) if   12 and ( −   ) if   12
3.2.2 Industry Standards
Consider now the industry’s behavior when it is free to set its own standards without competition
from the NGO. The industry trade association wants to set its standards to maximize the total
profits of all firms. We first show that the industry always prefers to avoid having all firms certify
to a single standard.
Proposition 5 In autarky with multitier labels, the industry never prefers an equilibrium in which
both firm types certify to the same standard.
Proof. The profit-maximizing joint standard is Π ∈ (   ). The industry can necessarily raise
profits for both types of firms if it offers {   }. High-cost firms prefer  to Π, and their profits
are unaffected by the ambitious standard. Low-cost firms prefer   Π and they also prefer that
high-cost firms face a standard   Π , since a lower standard for the B firms raises prices for A
firms. To the extent that the industry then deviates from {   }, it must be that it further raises
joint profits.
Thus, the industry always chooses either a single ambitious standard that excludes the high-cost
firms, or a multi-tier standard. Interestingly, the combination of individually profit-maximizing
standards is never the optimal multi-tier strategy for the industry. To see how the industry deviates
from from this option, form the Lagrangian consisting of the industry objective function plus the
two important constraints: the ICB constraint (assigned the shadow value ), and the constraint
that the basic standard cannot be negative (shadow value ):
7The reader might wonder why Table 1 does not require that   23. The reason is shown in Lemma 1. When
  23   12 implies Θ  1 so it is impossible to have   Θ  Likewise, when   23  12 implies that   13 which means that Θ  1 so it is impossible to have   Θ
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L = ((1−)−  −  ¡¢2) +((1−)−  ¡¢2)
−((1−) −  − ) + 
The first-order condition with respect to the ambitious standard is
L
 = 
 ¡(1−)− 2¢+  = 0
Solving, we see the ambitious standard is independent of the basic standard, unless the ICB con-
straint is binding. (Although the ambitious standard does not affect the profits of the high-cost
firms, it does affect their ICB constraint.) Thus,
 =  + 
2 ≥ 0
The industry always sets a positive standard for the low-cost producers that is at or above their
profit-maximizing standard  , with the equality holding only when the ICB constraint does not
bind. Under these conditions, the ICA constraint is always met.
The first-order condition with respect to the basic standard is independent of the ambitious
standard, but not of the size of the ambitious market segment, since a higher  drives down prices
and profits for the A firms:
L
 = 
((1−)− 2)− + +  = 0
At the constrained optimum, the basic industry standard is defined by
 = 1− −
 + (+ )
2 = 
 − 

2 +
(+ )
2 
Note that the shadow value of the ICB constraint raises both standards. It drives them further
apart if   , or   , and brings them closer together otherwise.
Proposition 6 characterizes the industry’s optimal strategy in autarky, making use of the nota-
tion Θ1 = (1−)(1 +) and Θ2 = 1−(1−)(2(1−))
Proposition 6 When multitier labels are possible, the industry’s optimal standard in autarky is
given by the following. If   1− and   12 the optimal standard is ¡  0¢  If  
1− and   12, the optimal standard is
³
 + 2  ICB
´
if   Θ2 and
¡  0¢
otherwise. If   1− and   Θ1 , then the optimal standard is
³
 + 2  ICB
´

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Finally if   1− and   Θ1 , then the optimal standard is (   − 2 )
Proof. See the Appendix.
As Proposition 5 states, the industry association never wants to set a single standard to which
both types would adhere. However, if costs are sufficiently dispersed, it may choose to set only a
single ambitious standard, to avoid eroding any profits for the low-cost firms, even with a modest
basic standard for the high-cost firms.
To better visualize these possibilities, we summarize the industry’s optimal standard in Table
2 and illustrate them in Figures 7a and 7b. Note that the ambitious standard is always set at or
above its autarkic profit-maximizing level, while the basic standard is always distorted downwards
from its individually profit-maximizing level in order to reduce competition with the ambitious
firms.
Market Shares N 1−N (possible interior solution) N 1−N (no interior solution possible)
Relative Costs   Θ1 (if  = 0) 

  Θ1 

  12 Θ2  

  12 

  Θ2
s   + 2    + 2
s  − 2 ICB 0 0 ICB
Table 2: Characterization of the Industry Label in Autarky
This solution is presented graphically in Figure 7a for the case of  = 23, so  = (1 −)
at  = 12. If the ambitious market segment is larger than the uncertified segment, and the
A firms have substantially lower costs than the B firms, then the industry sets a single ambitious
standard that only the A firms can meet. When   12, this is  ; for a small range where
  12, the industry raises the ambitious standard above  to exclude the high-cost firms.
Otherwise the industry always offers a multi-tier label. When costs are more similar, the industry
is constrained by the ICB requirement. If the ambitious segment is smaller than the uncertified
segment but costs are sufficiently different, then the basic standard is  =  − 2 .
[Insert Figure 7a about here]
Figure 7b presents the case of  = 12, so  = (1−) at  = 1. In this case (and for
any   12), the industry always chooses a multi-tier standard, and the only question is whether
the ICB constraint it binding.
[Insert Figure 7b about here]
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3.3 Comparing the NGO and Industry Schemes
The labeling schemes offered by the NGO differ from those of the industry in terms of the structure
of the label, the number of firms that choose to label, and the stringency of standards.
In terms of label structure, the NGO offers a binary label for a wider range of parameter
values than does the industry. For large enough values of  both the NGO and the industry
will set a binary standard. More specifically, the NGO chooses a single ambitious label whenever
   (or   2 ) and   (1 − )((1 − )), and the industry does so
when   1− and   12. The NGO will also set a binary label when   2 and
  (1 − ) (2(1−))  this time at a level  that both types of firm can meet. The
industry never offers a binary label that attracts both types of firm.
The foregoing implies that there are many cases when the industry association would offer
a multi-tiered label, but the NGO would not. If   2, and either   1 −  and/or
  Θ2 , then the NGO would set an ambitious binary label and the industry would offer
a multi-tiered label. In this case, the industry label attracts greater participation than the NGO
label. Alternatively, when   min{2 1 −} and   (1 −)[2(1 −)] the NGO
sets a basic binary label and the industry offers a multi-tier label.
In terms of stringency, the NGO’s ambitious standard is always higher than the industry’s
ambitious standard when  = . Furthermore, since the NGO only chooses a multi-tier label
when    , that implies that  =  −    −    . However, the following lemma
shows that the industry can set a higher ambitious standard.
Lemma 2 The industry may set a more stringent ambitious standard than the NGO.
Proof. This possibility occurs when both organizations want a multi-tier standard and (2) 
 −  −  . Since the stringency of the ICB constraint increases monotonically in , we
evaluate the standards at  = 1 and find ∗ −(−) = (1−)2  0. Such an outcome
is also possible when the NGO sets a basic standard and (2)   −  . Consider the case
where  =  , so the NGO is indifferent between the basic and multi-tier standard. If the ICB
constraint is binding, then the industry will set a more stringent standard.
Thus, as the cost differences get small, the NGO may set a lower ambitious standard than
the industry, in order to maintain a higher basic standard, while industry sets a higher ambitious
standard in order to keep its basic standard low. These possibilities can be observed in Figures 6
and 7; the borderline between the basic and multi-tier standards for the NGO when  = 5 lies
within the constrained multi-tier standards for the industry.
On the other hand, whenever the industry is not constrained, or the NGO prefers a single
20
ambitious standard, the industry standard is never higher than the NGO’s.
It is also worth noting that the industry may set a more stringent standard for the high-cost
firms than does the NGO. For example, there are parameter values for which the NGO sets an
ambitious binary label (which implicitly sets  = 0) but the industry sets a multi-tiered label
with   0 Thus, the industry tends to attract a greater number of firms to participate in
labeling than does the NGO. However, as the following lemma shows, this is not always the case.
Lemma 3 In autarky with multi-tier labels, the NGO may attract more participation than the
industry if the total certified market size is large enough.
Proof. The industry always garners as much or more participation except in the case where the
industry wants a single ambitious label, while the NGO prefers a multi-tier label. The industry
has a single ambitious label when   1 −  and   12 or 

  Θ2 . The NGO sets
a multi-tier or single basic label if   2 or   Θ . These two situations can thus
occur if 2    1 −  , which requires   23. By Lemma 1, the NGO will not set a
single basic standard in this range, but rather the multi-tier standard. Thus, when   23 and

  max[12 Θ2 ], the NGO has full participation and separate standards, while the industry
only certifies the low-cost firms.
When the certified market is large and low-cost firms have both a big cost advantage and a
large market share, the industry may prefer to set a single ambitious standard that yields a high
price. The NGO would be willing to introduce more competition into the certified market, and
would offer a multi-tier label instead. Thus, there exist situations in which the NGO will attract
more participation than the industry in autarky.
4 Label Competition
We now consider what happens if the two organizations compete. We first analyze binary label
competition, in which each can offer only one standard, and then competition with multi-tier
standards.
4.1 Binary Label Competition
In binary label competition, each organization is restricted to offering a single standard. If two
labels emerge as a result, we have two possible equilibria: in a “Normal” equilibrium, the NGO
focuses on the ambitious firms and the industry takes the basic label; in a “Reverse” equilibrium, the
opposite occurs, and the industry sets the ambitious label. Thus, for each best response function,
we consider separately the cases where the organization chooses  and where it chooses .
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4.1.1 NGO Best Response
The NGO wants to maximize environmental gains  =  +  Because its objective
function is linear in the standards, the NGO’s best response never involves an interior solution, and
instead is always at a corner solution defined by a constraint. The two constraints from the NGO’s
binary label problem are still relevant:  ≤  and  ≤ ICA =  − .
If the industry sets the ambitious standard, the NGO responds with  =  unless    
in which case the NGO sets  =  and leaves the high-cost firms indifferent between the two
standards.
If the industry sets the basic standard, then the NGO maximizes its standard subject to the IC
constraint for the low-cost firms, namely  = ICA ≡ − .8 The NGO then chooses whichever
gives the largest environmental gain. The latter is chosen if ( − )  ( − ), or if
( − )  ( − ).
4.1.2 Industry Best Response
If NGO sets the ambitious standard, then the industry has two options. It can set a standard
that attracts only the high-cost firms, in which case it follows similar criteria for its choice of 
in the multi-tier setting, so  = max{0  ICB}. Alternatively, it can set a basic standard that
attracts both types of firms, i.e.,  = Π.
If the NGO sets the basic standard, the industry’s best response is given by the same first-order
condition for  as in its autarky multi-tier problem, so  = max[  ICB]. (Recall that this
condition does not depend on the level of  unless the ICB constraint is binding and the industry
wants to avoid a multitier equilibrium).
4.1.3 Binary Label Equilibrium
We will consider the potential equilibria in turn. Importantly, for many relevant viable options,
the industry’s best response is not a function of the NGO’s standard, or vice-versa, which greatly
simplifies the analysis of the equilbrium in binary label competition.
Normal equilibrium In the “Normal” equilibrium the industry sets the basic standard, and the
NGO determines the ambitious standard. In this case, the NGO maximizes its standard subject
to the IC constraint for the low-cost firms, namely  ≤ ICA ≡  −  . As noted above, there
are only four possible options for the industry: 0  ICB or Π  However, we cannot have
8 If    , the NGO could offer a higher standard that also attracts the high-cost firms while giving them the
same profits, or  −  . However, as shown below, this never occurs in equilibrium.
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an equilibrium with ( 0), since profits would be zero, which is obviously sub-optimal for the
industry. Furthermore, both incentive compatibility constraints cannot bind simultaneously, so we
cannot have an equilibrium with (ICA ICB). Thus, if this first type of equilibrium exists, it must
be either ( −  ) or ( − Π Π).
Which is more profitable for the industry? One might think  would be more profitable, since
it derives from the industry’s optimization problem. But it turns out that Π is more profitable.
We know from Proposition 2 that the most profitable standard the industry can set and attract
both types of firms is Π . Furthermore, whichever choice the industry makes, the NGO’s standard
is constructed to be just as profitable for the low-cost firms as the industry standard (and does not
change the profits of high-cost firms). Therefore,
Π( − Π Π) = Π(Π Π)  Π( ) = Π( −  )
Thus, the Normal equilibrium takes the form ( − Π Π)9
Reverse equilibrium In the “Reverse” equilibrium, the industry sets the ambitious standard,
while the NGO stakes out the basic standard. We know from above that the industry chooses  =
max[  ICB] However, since ICB is only necessary to maintain separation if    , and the
NGO will never choose such a low standard, we thus have  =  . Since the low-cost firms will
not be deterred from their profit-maximizing standard, the NGO will ask the most of the high-cost
firms that it can. If    , its best response is  ; if    , the NGO cannot attract any
participation if it attempts to set a standard above the industry standard, so it opts to set the same
standard ( =  ) or, equivalently, not to set a standard at all ( = 0) and let the high-cost
firms adhere to the ambitious label.10
Thus, the Reverse equilibrium takes the form ( min{   })
Global stability As shown above, we have two potential equilibria, each involving a local best
response to the other. For each potential equilibrium, however, we must also check its global
stability, i.e. we must check that each player is willing to target its assigned group of firms, rather
than defect and attempt to draw away the firms assigned to the other.
It turns out the NGO never has an incentive to deviate. For the Normal equilibrium, the NGO
would only deviate if offering a basic standard instead would encourage more environmental gains
from the high-cost firms than would be lost among the low-cost firms. Since  = Π    the
9Note that since   Π   ,  − Π   and Π  ICB 
10Note that this result contrasts with Li and van’t Veldt (2015), who find that the NGO always wants to enter
against an Industry standard.
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NGO could only attract the high-cost firms by offering a weaker standard, which it has no incentive
to do. Furthermore, the low-cost firms would certify to a lower standard (Π instead of  − Π) if
the NGO deviates to become the basic standard. Hence, the NGO would not want to deviate from
the Normal equilibrium. Nor will the NGO deviate from the Reverse equilibrium, since it cannot
ask for any more environmental gains from either kind of firm, given the industry sets  .
Thus, stability depends on whether the industry will deviate. To assess this, we explore two
cases, depending on whether    . (This condition depends on the relative costs and relative
market shares of the two types of firms:   Θ = (1−) (2(1−)). For it to hold, the
low-cost firms cannot have costs that are less than half those of the high-cost firms; this threshold
falls the larger is the market share of the low-cost firms.)
Narrow cost differential (   ) If the industry deviates from the Normal equilibrium
to set the ambitious standard instead, it would deviate to  . In this case, the NGO’s standard of
−Π will attract no participation, since −Π    If    , deviating to  would attract
the high-cost firms as well, who have no weaker option, but the industry would not prefer this,
since by definition, the single basic standard that maximizes profits is Π, so Π(Π Π)  Π(   ).
Thus, the Normal equilibrium is globally stable if    .
In contrast, the industry will deviate from the Reverse equilibrium if    . If the NGO sets
no standard, then deviating to Π raises profits, since Π(Π Π)  Π(   ). If the NGO offers
 , the industry would want to deviate to , since doing so raises profits. Therefore, we cannot
have a Reverse equilibrium if    .
Wide cost differential (   ) This situation is more complicated. In the Normal
equilibrium, if the industry deviates to set the ambitious standard  , the low-cost firms will
certainly prefer that, and the high-cost firms will find both that and  − Π out of their reach.
Thus, the Normal equilibrium is stable as long as the industry prefers the joint basic standard to
the single ambitious standard in autarky. Otherwise, if Π(Π Π)  Π(  0), the industry would
deviate.
In the Reverse equilibrium, the NGO is offering    , so the industry will deviate if
Π( max{0 })  Π(  ). We know from profit maximization that Π( max{0 }) 
Π(  Π). Furthermore, Π(  Π)  Π(Π Π); since Π     , total profits are higher
with this differentiation, because the high-cost firms have the same profits while the low-cost
firms benefit from having a higher standard, closer to their profit-maximizing one. By defini-
tion, Π(Π Π)  Π(  0) if the industry prefers a single basic standard in autarky. Finally,
Π(  0)  Π(  ), since the high cost firms have no profits in either case, but the low-cost
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firms’ profits are lower with the positive basic standard. Thus, a sufficient condition for the in-
dustry to deviate from the Reverse standard is that in autarky it would prefer the single basic
standard.11
Stability is not guaranteed if the industry prefers the ambitious standard in autarky, i.e. if
Π(  0)  Π(Π Π). With this autarky preference, however, if  is very close to 0, it is clear
that the industry would not want to deviate to leave the low-cost firms with a much weaker label.
Thus, there exist some parameters with    such that the industry would not want to deviate.
More precisely, the Reverse equilibrium is stable if    and Π( max{0 })  Π(  ).
The possibility remains that neither equilibrium is stable, which occurs if     Π(Π Π) 
Π(  0), and Π(  )  Π( max{0 }).
In summary, we have demonstrated the following proposition.
Proposition 7 When the two sponsors compete using binary labels, two types of local equilibria
exist. (a) In the Normal equilibrium, the NGO sets an ambitious standard and the industry sets
a basic standard; standards take the form ( − Π Π) where Π = (1−)2 This equilibrium
is globally stable if and only if    . (b) In the Reverse equilibrium, the industry sets an
ambitious standard of  and the NGO sets a standard of min{   }. This equilibrium is globally
stable if and only if    , the industry would prefer a single ambitious label in autarky, and
Π( max{0 })  Π(  ).
Thus, there are two kinds of globally stable equilibria, each of which applies for a specific set
of parameter values. If the cost differential between firms is narrow, the NGO sets the ambitious
standard, and the industry sets the basic standard it would choose in autarky. If, on the other hand,
the cost differential is wide and the industry in autarky would prefer the single ambitious label, a
Reverse equilibrium can be supported, where the industry sets the profit-maximizing standard for
the low-cost firms, and the NGO asks for the most it can from the high-cost firms.12
Outcomes Notably, with the Normal equilibrium, the industry profit outcomes under competi-
tion are identical to what they would be under industry autarky. With the Reverse equilibrium,
however, they are lower, because the industry would have preferred a single ambitious standard,
but the NGO offers the high-cost firms a positive standard that keeps their profits the same but
erodes the profits of the low-cost firms. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
11This autarky preference and the previously proven relationships ensure that Π( max{0 })  Π(  Π) 
Π(Π  Π)  Π(  0)  Π(  ).
12The possible existence of each of these types of binary equilibria parallels the findings in Fischer and Lyon (2014).
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Proposition 8 Suppose the two sponsors compete using binary labels. A globally stable equilibrium
never raises profits relative to an industry binary label in autarky.
Next, consider the environmental outcomes. Because the NGO only enters into label compe-
tition to increase environmental benefits relative to industry autarky, the interesting question is
whether competition improves over NGO autarky.
Proposition 9 Suppose the two sponsors compete using binary labels. Label competition erodes
environmental gains relative to NGO autarky when    (  Θ). Label competition
can only improve environmental outcomes relative to NGO autarky if    and    and
either 1) competition yields a Normal equilibrium (Θ    Θ ); or 2) competition
yields a Reverse equilibrium and the NGO would set a basic standard in autarky (i.e., if Θ 
  Θ ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, for label competition with a Normal equilibrium to offer better environmental
protection than NGO autarky, one must have some special conditions. First, costs must be suffi-
ciently differentiated (   ), but not too differentiated, since the industry must prefer a single
basic standard in autarky (  Θ ). At the same time, there must be more high-cost than
low-cost firms (  ). Alternatively, one could have the conditions for a Reverse equilibrium
to hold while the NGO would prefer a single basic label in autarky, since the availability of the
profit-maximizing standard for low-cost firms would allow them to certify to a higher standard.
We end this section by comparing our results with the results of Fischer and Lyon (2014), who
study competition between binary labels under a different set of assumptions. The earlier paper dif-
fers from this one in two important ways. First, the previous paper used a representative consumer
framework for the demand side of the model, while the present paper uses a vertical-differentiation
framework based on heterogeneous consumers, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). Second, the previous
paper had a continuum of firms with varying costs of compliance, while the present paper has two
types of firms differentiated by their cost of compliance. Despite the differences in assumptions,
the basic results are qualitatively similar. First, there are two types of equilibria, a Normal one in
which the NGO offers a more ambitious standard than does the industry, and a Reverse equilibrium
in which the industry offers the more ambitious standard. Second, label competition sometimes
offers better environmental performance than NGO autarky, especially if there is a large cost gap
between high-cost and low-cost firms and there is a large number of high-cost firms. Under these
conditions, a standard-setting entity faces a stark tradeoff between extracting substantial improve-
ments from low-cost firms and inducing participation by high-cost firms. Because it is impossible to
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accomplish both goals at once, label competition may be beneficial by setting a separate standard
for each group of firms. An important difference between the two analyses, however, is that in the
earlier paper, a Normal equilibrium always exists, while in the present paper its existence depends
upon parameter values.
4.2 Equilibrium with Two Multi-Tier Labels
We turn now to label competition when both sponsors can offer multi-tiered labels. The fact that the
NGO and the industry association have not only different preferences but also different situations
in which they would not on their own offer a second label leaves room for label competition. Given
the complexity of the results for the autarky cases, one might expect multi-tier label competition
to produce extremely complicated results. However, exactly the opposite turns out to be the case.
Unlike autarky, where each organization’s labeling scheme depends upon details of the parameters,
and unlike binary label competition, where many local equilibria are unstable, we are able to show
the striking result that under multi-tier label competition there is a single perfect equilibrium
regardless of bparameter values.
Proposition 10 Under multi-tier label competition, the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
involves each player offering a multi-tier label of the form (   )
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 10 provides the remarkable result that there is a unique equilibrium pair of standards
under label competition, with each sponsor offering a multi-tier label, each tier of which maximizes
profits for one industry segment or the other. With multi-tier label competition between an NGO
and industry association, the only outcome that satsfies trembling-hand perfection is identical
multi-tier labels set at the same levels as if there were two separate industry groups! This outcome
is illustrated in Figure 8 below.
[Figure 8 about here]
This result is surely counterintuitive at first blush, at least for readers familiar with the cer-
tification industry. The fact that the equilibrium is driven almost entirely by industry profit-
maximization considerations, rather than environmental protection, seems to run counter to casual
empirical evidence that NGOs set tough standards that go beyond what industry prefers. However
the logic is clear and has two distinct components. First, the industry always sets its ambitious
standard at the profit-maximizing level for the low-cost firms so it is impossible for the NGO to
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induce these firms to adopt any more stringent label. Second, the industry prefers to distort down-
ward the basic standard in order to increase overall industry profits, a result familiar from the
vertical differentiation literature (Shaked and Sutton 1982). Thus, competition from the NGO can
raise the basic standard and improve environmental performance and it is impossible for the indus-
try to induce these firms to adopt a weaker standard. In effect, the NGO sets a minimum quality
standard that reduces the excessive product differentiation desired by the industry.13 The fact that
each sponsor offers a multi-tier label is then simply a response to the possibility of trembles by the
other player. We discuss the implications of this result further below.
5 Pareto-Improving Cooperative Solutions
To this point we have focused solely on non-cooperative solutions to the ecolabel game. Here we
explore whether there may be cooperative outcomes that would be preferred by both players to the
multi-tier equilibrium.
The question is whether there exists a  6=  and  6=  such that Π(  )  Π(   )
and (  )  (   ). Consider an adjustment that holds environmental benefits constant:
 + ( −) =  + ( −) . Thus, we solve for this  as a function of  :
 =
(1−)( −)  + (1−)
2( −) −

( −)

Maximizing profits Π(  ()) with respect to  , we get
 =
( −)  + (1−)
2( + ( −)  )

Furthermore,
 −  = ( −
)
2( + ( −)  )
 0
and
 −  = ( −
)
2( + ( −)  )
 0
Because we have held environmental benefits constant, we know that    
Therefore, there is room to raise profits without lessening environmental gains (and vice-versa).
Both parties can do better by coordinating than engaging in a non-cooperative multi-tier equilib-
13This result is similar to the analysis of minimum quality standards in Ronnen (1991).
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rium. The result is more product differentiation than would occur in the noncooperative equilib-
rium, and more environmental effort by the low-cost firms. We leave the details of a cooperative
analysis for future research.
6 Discussion
Our model yields a rich set of testable predictions, along with some normative implications. We first
analyzed the labeling strategies of NGO and industry label sponsors in autarky, and showed that
they differ substantially in their ecolabeling preferences. First, the NGO sets more stringent binary
standards than does the industry. Second, the industry prefers multi-tier labels in a wider range of
situations than does the NGO. Third, the industry never sets a binary standard that can be met
by all firms, but the NGO does so when the cost differential between firms is narrow and there are
roughly the same number of high-cost and low-cost firms. We then turned to label competion, and
developed a series of results. First, when the cost differential between firms is narrow, binary label
competition takes the Normal form, with the NGO setting the ambitious standard, and the industry
setting the basic standard it would choose in autarky. Second, if the cost differential is wide and
the industry in autarky would prefer the single ambitious label, a Reverse binary equilibrium can
be supported, where the industry sets the profit-maximizing standard for the low-cost firms, and
the NGO asks for the most it can from the high-cost firms. Third, binary label competition only
improves environmental outcomes when there is a wide cost differential between firms and there
are more high-cost than low-cost firms. Fourth, multi-tier label competition takes a unique, robust
form that is largely determined by industry preferences. Finally, we showed that there is room for
cooperative agreements between NGO and industry sponsors that can simultaneously raise profits
and improve environmental gains. In this section, we discuss how these results map onto stylized
facts about label competition.
As described by Conroy (2007), many certification systems sprang from campaigns by NGOs
that attacked existing corporate practices and demanded higher standards. As first movers, these
NGOs possessed market power in setting standards, as described by our analysis of NGO autarky.
As our analysis of label competition demonstrates, however, these first movers lose considerable
market power when confronted with entry by industry associations. Thus, theoretical models of
ecolabels that ignore the role of competition are likely to provide quite an unrealistic picture that
exaggerates the power of certification to shift markets.
Our results for Normal equilibria under binary label competition are consistent with the con-
ventional wisdom that NGOs generally set tougher standards than industry associations. Consider,
for example, the forest products sector, where Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification was
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created in 1993 by a coalition of NGOs, including Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, which
were disappointed when nations failed to sign a global forest convention at the Rio Earth Summit
(Sasser et al. 2006). The Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), in turn, was created a year later by
the American Forest and Paper Association, an industry trade group, as an alternative that gave
industry members greater flexibility than the FSC system. Angered by the emergence of the SFI,
which they clearly considered a weak alternative, NGOs supportive of FSC have continually blasted
the SFI alternative as a sham. In fact, on May 20, 2005, a group of NGOs took out a full-page ad
in the New York Times that said:
“How can you trust the timber industry to measure its own environmental sustainabil-
ity? Isn’t that like the fox guarding the henhouse? Simply stated, the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative program is a historic greenwashing effort to blur the public’s trust
in ecolabeling, helping loggers appear “sustainable” when it’s really just the Same-old
Forest industry.”
One way our results may appear to depart from conventional wisdom, however, is that in
practice many ecolabels take a binary form, which our model shows is dominated by a multi-tier
structure under competition. There are several possible explanations for this. First, it could be that
there is little variation in costs among industry members, so that there is no need for multiple tiers.
Second, the use of binary labels may stem from the fact that many ecolabels are consumer-facing,
and consumers are easily overwhelmed by choice complexity. Interestingly, the European appliance
market uses ecolabels with multiple tiers. However, these are sponsored by the European Union,
rather than being the outcome of competition between NGOs and an industry association. One
might then think of them as being the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process such as that
suggested in section 5 above. Third, the use of binary labels could derive from transaction costs in
the creation and maintenance of complex, multi-tier labels. Fourth, it could be that in particular
sectors, there is no consumer willingness to pay for greener products. In this case, ecolabels can
only be supported by anti-corporate campaigns by NGOs, as in Baron’s (2011) interesting model.
Such campaigns may need to keep the focus on a simple binary ecolabel in order to maximize the
strength of its campaign. We believe future research into these various rationales for the use of
binary ecolabels would be a promising avenue of investigation.
An interesting possibility is that current outcomes in the ecolabel market are not consistent with
being in a long-run equilibrium. In fact, it turns out that there are good reasons to suspect that
the current ecolabel market is not in long-run equilibrium. According to www.ecolabelindex.com,
the number of ecolabels on offer has grown sharply over time, with 444 currently available in 197
countries and 25 industry sectors. Many commentators have decried this proliferation of labels,
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fearing that it leads to consumer confusion and a loss of faith in the whole ecolabeling enterprise. For
example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has held a series of
meetings devoted to exploring solutions to the problems created by ecolabel proliferation.14 Many
observers expect there will ultimately be consolidation in the ecolabel industry, just as there often
is in other industries, but they have been at a loss to predict the form of the industry shakeout.15
One reason that consolidation and equilibrium seem to be so slow in the ecolabel industry is that
many label sponsors are non-profits, whose motivations may lie more in maintaining their position
in the market rather than seeking out profitable or efficient outcomes.
Although our analysis is not explicitly dynamic, it provides some intriguing indications of how
the ecolabel market may evolve over time. As shown in Proposition 8, the unique multi-tier equi-
librium in our model involves two standards, each set at the level that is profit-maximizing for one
class of firms. These are very much industry-driven outcomes, the only wrinkle being that there
is somewhat more intense label competition than would be profit-maximizing for the industry as a
whole. We also showed that a cooperative arrangement can be Pareto-improving, suggesting that
consolidation and multi-stakeholder governance structures are likely to be part of any ultimate
equilibrium. Interestingly, the apparel industry appears to have already evolved from a situation
dominated by NGO labels to one dominated by business-led labels (Marques 2013). Concerns about
sweatshop labor in the apparel industry were initially voiced in 1989 by an activist NGO, Clean
Clothes Campaign (CCC). Over time, more and more organizations, both non-profit and industry-
driven, entered the space, to the point that by 2005 the CCC was stating publicly its concern that
there were “too many multi-stakeholder initiatives” (Marques, 2013, p. 26). In 2007, the Global
Social Compliance Program (GSCP) was launched in an effort to harmonize the growing set of
standards, and in 2013 Wal-Mart’s Sustainability Consortium launched a Clothing, Textiles and
Footwear working group to help drive convergence across standards in a way that was consistent
with Wal-Mart’s goals, which can be assumed to be largely market-driven.
There are signs of movement towards greater business domination within the realm of sustain-
ability labels, as well. The U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED), which offers Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum tiers, long held a monopoly po-
sition in building certification. It has recently attracted competition from the new Green Globes
certification scheme, an industry-led alternative that offers faster and less expensive certification
than LEED (Alter 2013), and that is supported by U.S. timber companies because it does not
14The OECD has also commissioned a series of white papers on ecolabel proliferation (Gruère, 2013; Lyon, 2014).
15Heyes and Martin (forthcoming) offer an interesting model in which ecolabels are differentiated both horizontally
and vertically, which allows them to address the question of the equilibrium number of labels. Each label is binary
and occupies a unique horizontal niche, however, so the issue of multi-tier competition does not arise in their model.
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require FSC certification for lumber used in construction (Bach 2013). Within the timber sector,
there is some evidence that the standards of the FSC and the SFI have gradually been converging,
as FSC has become more market-friendly and SFI has attempted to incorporate more conservation
concerns (Cashore et al., 2004). Surprisingly, however, recent work suggests that the standards
of both sponsors have been tightening over time, perhaps due to changes in preferences among
consumers (Lord et al., 2015). In the coffee sector, there appears to be convergence among multiple
different labels in terms of core criteria, but with some level of differentiation remaining as labels
go after consumer groups with differing preferences (Reinecke et al., 2012).
Although it would be premature to claim that labeling schemes for any of these sectors have
reached equilibrium, our results suggest that a plausible long-run outcome will be convergence
toward business-led harmonized certification schemes, perhaps followed by a cooperative bargaining
process that results in a single multi-stakeholder label.
7 Conclusions
We have developed the first theoretical model of competitive multi-tier ecolabels, and characterized
such labels for the case of autarky with an NGO or an industry association choosing the standards,
as well as for competition between these two types of standard-setting organizations. This is an
important theoretical step, since although the literature has focused on labels that are binary in
structure, some prominent labels, such as the US Green Building Council’s LEED certification, have
multiple tiers instead and all labels could potentially choose to have multiple tiers. We present a
theory explaining how standard-setting organizations choose between these two forms, and compare
the differing incentives of industry trade associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in setting standards. We show that for either type of organization in autarky, multi-tier labels
are more attractive when the number of low-cost producers is small and the cost gap between
low-cost and high-cost firms is large. When the two types of organization compete using binary
ecolabels, multiple equilibria may exist and the NGO may offer either the more ambitious label or
the basic label; competition may provide either more or less environmental protection depending
upon industry structure. When competition occurs using multi-tier labels, however, there exists a
unique equilibrium pair of standards, and competition always provides less environmental protection
than would the NGO in autarky. Our results suggest that competition between ecolabels may
involve mergers or cooperation between NGO and industry labels, but that in equilibrium the
standards reflected in these labels will be dominated by considerations of profitability as opposed
to environmental protection.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is by contradiction. Consider first the case where   12
The single basic standard is optimal for   (1−)((1−)) The right-hand side of
this expression is greater than unity for  ∈ (1−) so in order for the single basic standard
to be optimal we must have   1 −  However, we are in the case where   12
Furthermore, 1−  2 is equivalent to   23 Hence   23 contradicts the assumption
that   12 Now consider the case where   12 The single basic standard is optimal
for   (1−)(2(1−)) The right-hand side of this expression is greater than unity for
  2−1 so in order for the single basic standard to be optimal we must have   2−1 For
  23 this requires   13 However, we are in the case where   12 or   13.
Hence it is impossible for the NGO to prefer the single basic standard when   23¥
Proof of Proposition 6: First, consider the case where the ICB constraint is not binding, so
 = 0. Then the basic standard is set lower than would be profit-maximizing just for the high-cost
firms, because raising it lowers prices for the low-cost types. Let us define the basic standard that
would prevail in an interior solution ( = 0 and  = 0) as
 ≡  −2
If   1 −  (that is, if the type A market share is smaller than the share of consumers not
purchasing a labeled product),   0. However, if   1− , then  −2  0 which
means that   0, and  = 0.
Now, consider the case where the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for the high-cost
firms, so   0 and  = ICB. Since ICB ≤  , we know now that in all cases the industry wants
to hold the high-cost firms to a lower standard than would maximize their individual type profits.
Next, we analyze the conditions under which the ICB constraint binds. To solve for the shadow
value of the constraint, we set the optimal basic standard equal to the incentive-compatible basic
standard, evaluated at the optimal ambitious standard:  = ICB( + 2 ), or  − 

2 +
(−)
2 = (1−) −  − 2 , which leads to
 = 

 + ((1 +
) − (1−)) + 

 +
We noted above that if   1 −  , then the industry offers the high-cost firms a positive
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standard. Solving for  = 0 when  = 0, we find that the ICB constraint binds if

  Θ
1 ≡ 1−

1 +  (5)
In this case, inequality (5) simply determines whether or not the multi-tiered standard adds the
shadow value of the ICB constraint to the interior solution.
However, if   1− then   0, and the constraint that  ≥ 0 will bind if the shadow
value  is not large enough on its own. In this case, as with the binary standard problem, as long
as   0, the industry chooses max[   ]. To explore this range of possibilities, recall that the
ICB constraint binds if at  , ICB  0. Substituting, we obtain
ICB( ) = (1−) −  =
µ
 −
1
2
¶

We see immediately that if the ambitious firms have very low relative costs (  12), then
ICB  0 and the constraint that  ≥ 0 is the only one binding; in this case, the industry chooses
a single standard of  . On the other hand, if the costs of the two firm types are more similar
(  12), then the ICB constraint binds; however, the constraint that  ≥ 0 may also bind.
Even with a positive , the industry may still want a negative  to create more separation between
the standards; if it is constrained from doing so, it will choose instead to raise  alone to meet the
ICB requirement, before offering multi-tiered standards. In this case, the industry chooses  .
Finally, as the ICB constraint becomes more binding and the shadow value  rises, we arrive
again in the region where   0, so  = 0, and we have the multi-tier solution {  }. To
solve for this border, we set  =  , evaluated at the equilibrium value of ; i.e., (1−) =
 + 2 = (1−2
+)
2(+) . Solving for the cost ratio, we find that (for   1 − ) the
multi-tier solution occurs when

  Θ
2 ≡ 1− (1−)2(1−)  (6)
Note that Θ2  Θ only when   1− ¥
Proof of Proposition 9: Start with the case where    , in which case a stable Normal
equilibrium is assured. Suppose that in autarky the NGO would choose a single basic standard of
 . Environmental gains are then eroded by Normal label competition if(−Π)+Π−
 0. Since by assumption   2 , we have ( − Π) + Π −   (2 − Π) +
Π − = (−)( − Π). Thus,    is a sufficient condition for environmental
losses. If instead   , but the NGO would still choose a basic standard in autarky, then
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( − Π) + Π −   ( − Π) + Π −  =  −   0, by revealed
preference for the basic standard. Alternatively, suppose the NGO would choose the ambitious
label in autarky, for which    is a necessary condition.16 Then label competition also
erodes environmental improvements because ( − Π) +Π − = ( −)Π  0.
Thus, when    Normal label competition is bad for the environment.
Now consider the case where    and a Normal equilibrium exists. (This requires
Θ    Θ .)17 As in the previous analysis, if    then competition low-
ers environmental outcomes, regardless of the NGO’s autarky preference. If   , on the
other hand, then environmental gains are higher with label competition. If the NGO would set
the basic standard in autarky, then ( − Π) + Π −  = 2 + ( − )Π −
  2 + ( − ) −  = ( − )  0. If instead the NGO would set
an ambitious standard in autarky (this requires Θ  Θ    Θ ), then
( − Π) +Π − = ( −)Π  0.
Finally consider the case where    and a Reverse equilibrium exists. In this case, envi-
ronmental gains are higher under competition if the NGO would set a basic standard in autarky:
 +  − = ( − )  0. If instead the NGO would set an ambitious stan-
dard in autarky, then environmental gains are lower under competition:  + − =
 −   −  0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 10: Proposition 1 shows that    =   Since  maximizes the
profits of the low-cost firms, the industry will always undercut the NGO’s ambitious standard with
 , and the NGO will not be able to attract the low-cost firms away; were the NGO to offer the
label,  is the best it can do. When it comes to the basic label, Table 2 shows that if the industry
offers a basic standard, it is always distorted below  to maintain profits for the low-cost firms.
Thus, the NGO can raise the standard for the high-cost firms to at least  , and the industry
can do nothing to attract those firms away. Nor can the NGO go higher than  , because then
the industry could attract the high-cost firms away with a lower standard. Furthermore, since 
is the profit-maximizing standard for the low-cost firms regardless of , even with a higher 
than the industry would like, the industry has no incentive to further raise  to differentiate the
products. How the outcome is implemented–that is, exactly which label each sponsor offers–is
less clear. One possibility is that the two sponsors offer identical multi-tier labels. This equilibrium
is robust to “trembles” in the sense of Selten (1975). If the industry makes a small deviation
from  = (   ) to play ( −   − ) the NGO’s best response for   0 and/or   0 is
16 If   2 and     then the NGO prefers a single basic standard, as shown earlier.
17This requires Θ    Θ .
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to offer  = ( +   + ) and for   0 and/or   0 the NGO’s best response is to offer
 = ( + ||  + ||) Either way, as  → 0 and  → 0 the NGO’s best response converges to
the equilibrium value.
Similar logic applies for the industry’s best response. If the NGO makes a small deviation from
 = (   ) to play ( −   − ) the industry’s best response for   0 and/or   0 is
to offer  = (   − ) and for   0 and/or   0 the industry’s best response is to offer
 = (   + ) Either way, as → 0 and → 0 the industry’s best response converges to the
equilibrium value.
An alternative is that the industry offers only the ambitious standard and the NGO offers
the basic standard, but this equilibrium is not robust to trembles. If the industry makes a small
deviation from  = (  0) to play (− 0) the NGO’s best response is to offer  = (+ })
As → 0 the NGO’s best response does not converge to  = (0  ). Similar logic applies for the
industry’s best response.
One might also think that it would be an equilibrium for the NGO to set the ambitious standard
 and the industry to set the basic standard  , but this also does not survive the equilibrium
refinement of trembling-hand perfection. Suppose the NGO makes a small deviation from playing
 = (  0) to play ( +  0) The industry’s best response is to offer  = ( max{0  ICB)
Furthermore, even as → 0 the industry’s best response remains ( max{0  ICB) and never
converges to (0  ) On the other hand, if the industry makes a small deviation from  = (0  )
to play (0  − ) the NGO’s best response is to offer  = (ICA  + ) Again, the NGO’s best
response does not converge to (  0) even as → 0¥
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